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Abstract. Secret sharing provides a means to distribute shares of a secret such that any authorized
subset of shares, specified by an access structure, can be pooled together to recompute the
secret. The standard secret sharing model requires public access structures, which violates privacy
and facilitates the adversary by revealing high-value targets. In this paper, we address this
shortcoming by introducing hidden access structures, which remain secret until some authorized
subset of parties collaborate. The central piece of this work is the construction of a set-system
H with strictly greater than exp
(
c
1.5(log h)2
log log h
)
subsets of a set of h elements. Our set-system
H is defined over Zm, where m is a non-prime-power, such that the size of each set in H is
divisible by m but the sizes of their pairwise intersections are not divisible by m, unless one set is
a subset of another. We derive a vector family V from H such that superset-subset relationships
in H are represented by inner products in V. We use V to “encode” the access structures and
thereby develop the first access structure hiding secret sharing scheme. The information rate
(secret-size/maximum-share-size) of our scheme is 1/2. For a setting with ℓ parties, our scheme
supports 2ℓ out of the 22
ℓ−O(log ℓ)
possible access structures. The scheme assumes semi-honest
polynomial-time parties, and its security relies on the Generalized Diffie-Hellman assumption.
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1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme [46, 6, 28] is a method by which a dealer, holding a secret string, distributes strings,
called shares, to parties such that authorized subsets of parties, specified by a public access structure, can
reconstruct the secret. Secret sharing is the foundation of multiple cryptographic tools (in addition to its
obvious use in secure storage), such as, threhsold cryptography [15], (secure) multiparty computation [37],
attribute-based encryption [24], generalized oblivious transfer [50], perfectly secure message transmission [17],
e-voting [45, 30] and e-auctions [27, 8]. The extensive survey by Beimel [3] gives a review of the notable results
in the area.
1.1 Motivation
Existing secret sharing model requires the access structure to be known to the parties. Since secret recon-
struction requires shares of any authorized subset, from the access structure, having a public access structure
reveals the high-value targets, which can lead to compromised security in the presence of malicious parties.
Having a public access structure also implies that some parties must publicly consent to the fact that they
themselves are not trusted.
Need for Hidden Access Structures: Consider a scenario where Alice dictates her will/testament and instructs
her lawyer that each of her 15 family members should receive a valid “share” of the will. In addition, the
shares should be indistinguishable from each other in terms of size and entropy. She also insists that in order
to reconstruct her will, {Bob, Tom, Catherine} or {Bob, Cristine, Keri, Roger} or {Rob, Eve} must be part
of the collaborating set. But, Alice does not want to be in the bad books of her other, less trusted family
members. So, she demands that the shares of her will and the procedure to reconstruct it back from the shares
must not reveal her “trust structures”, until after the will is successfully reconstructed. This problem can be
generalized to secret sharing, but with hidden access structures, which remain secret until some authorized
subset of parties collaborate.
Superpolynomial Size Set-Systems and Efficient Cryptography: In this paper, we demonstrate that set-systems
with specific intersections can be used to enhance existing cryptographic protocols, particularly the ones
meant for distributed security. In order to minimize the computational cost of cryptographic protocols, it is
desirable that parameters such as exponents, moduli and dimensions do not grow too big. For a set-system
whose size is superpolynomial in the number of elements over which it is defined, achieving a large enough size
requires smaller modulus and fewer number of elements, which translates into smaller dimensions, exponents
and moduli for its cryptographic applications.
1.2 Related Work
A limited number of attempts have been made to introduce privacy-preserving features to secret sharing. The
first solution that focused on bolstering privacy in secret sharing was called anonymous secret sharing [49],
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wherein the secret can be reconstructed without the knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In
such schemes, secret reconstruction can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not know
the identities of the participants holding those shares. However, anonymous secret sharing completely discards
parties’ identities, which limits its applicability as an extension of secret sharing. Another issue is that the
known anonymous secret sharing schemes [49, 40, 7, 31, 42] operate in very restricted settings (e.g. n-out-of-n
threshold, 2-out-of-n threshold) or use hard to generate underlying primitives. For instance, the constructions
from [49, 7] use resolvable Steiner systems [47]. However, in design theory, resolvable Steiner systems are non-
trivial to achieve with a few known results in restricted settings [9, 51, 10, 14, 34, 38, 41, 43, 21, 32, 54, 55].
There are also known impossibility results concerning existence of certain desirable Steiner systems [39].
Other attempts made to realize anonymous secret sharing avoided the hard to generate primitives and
instead employed combinatorics [31]. But, they also lead to very restricted and specific thresholds.
Remark 1. Steiner systems have strong connections to a wide range of topics, including statistics, finite
group theory, finite geometry, combinatorial design, experimental design, storage systems design, wireless
communication, low-density parity-check code design, distributed storage, batch codes, and low-redundancy
private information retrieval. For an introduction to the subject, we refer the interested reader to [12, 11].
1.3 Our Contributions
We bolster the privacy guarantees of secret sharing by introducing hidden access structures, which remain
unknown until some authorized subset of parties collaborate. We develop the first access structure hiding
(computational) secret sharing scheme. As the basis of our scheme, we construct a novel set-system, which
is defined by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let {αi}
r
i=1 be r > 1 positive integers and m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i be a positive integer with r different
prime divisors: p1, . . . , pr. Then there exists c = c(m) > 0, such that for every integer h > 0, there exists
an explicitly constructible non-uniform¶ set-system H over a universe of h elements such that the following
conditions hold:
1. |H| > exp
(
c
1.5(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
,
2. ∀H ∈ H : |H| = 0 mod m,
3. ∀G,H ∈ H, where G 6= H : if H ⊂ G or G ⊂ H, then |G ∩H| = 0 mod m, else |G ∩H| 6= 0 mod m,
4. ∀G,H ∈ H, where G 6= H and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r} : |G ∩H| ∈ {0, 1} mod pαii .
(Recall that a mod m denotes the smallest non-negative b = a mod m.) In secret sharing, the family of
minimal authorized subsets Γ0 ∈ Γ , corresponding to an access structure Γ , is defined as the collection of the
minimal sets in Γ . Therefore, Γ0 forms the basis of Γ . Note that Conditions 2 and 3 of Theorem 1 define the
superset-subset relations in the set-system H. We derive a family of vectors V ∈ (Zm)
h from our set-system
¶ all member sets do not have equal size
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H, that captures the superset-subset relations in H as (vector) inner products in V. This capability allows
us to capture “information” about any minimal authorized subset A ∈ Γ0 in the form of an inner product,
enabling efficient testing of whether a given subset of parties B is a superset of A or not. Since Γ is monotone,
B ⊇ A, for some A ∈ Γ0, implies that B ∈ Γ , i.e., B is an authorized subset of parties. Similarly, B 6⊇ A, for
all A ∈ Γ0, implies that B /∈ Γ , i.e., B is not an authorized subset of parties. We use our novel set-system
and vector family to construct the first access structure hiding (computational) secret sharing scheme. We
assume semi-honest polynomial-time parties, and reduce the security and privacy guarantees of our scheme
to the Generalized Diffie-Hellman assumption [48]. The maximum share size for our scheme is ≈ 2|k|, where
|k| is the length of the secret.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we recall the pertinent background and results in Section 2.
Section 3 formally defines access structure hiding computational secret sharing. We present the construction
of our set-systems and vector families in Section 4, and use them to develop the first access structure hiding
computational secret sharing scheme in Section 5. We finish by describing two open problems.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by recalling an informal definition of the Generalized Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [48]. For
a formal definition, see [5]. For a positive integer n, we define [n] := {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 1 (GDH Assumption: Informal). Let {a1, a2, . . . , an} be a set of n different integers. Given
a group G and an element g ∈ G, it is hard to compute g
∏
i∈[n]
ai for an algorithm that can query g
∏
i∈I
ai
for any proper subset I ( [n].
Definition 2 (Dirichlet’s Theorem [16]). For all coprime integers a and q, there are infinitely many
primes, p, of the form p = a mod q.
Definition 3 (Euler’s Theorem). Let y be a positive integer and Z∗y denote the multiplicative group
mod y. Then for every integer c that is coprime to y, it holds that: cϕ(y) = 1 mod y, where ϕ(y) = |Z∗y|
denotes Euler’s totient function.
Definition 4 (Hadamard/Schur product). Hadamard/Schur product of two vectors u,v ∈ Rn, denoted
by u ◦ v, is a vector in the same linear space whose i-th element is defined as: (u ◦ v)[i] = u[i] · v[i], for all
i ∈ [n].
Definition 5 (Negligible Function). For security parameter ω, a function ǫ(ω) is called negligible if for
all c > 0 there exists a ω0 such that ǫ(ω) < 1/ω
c for all ω > ω0.
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Definition 6 (Computational Indistinguishability [23]). Let X = {Xω}ω∈N and Y = {Yω}ω∈N be
ensembles, where Xω’s and Yω’s are probability distributions over {0, 1}
κ(ω) for some polynomial κ(ω). We
say that {Xω}ω∈N and {Yω}ω∈N are polynomially/computationally indistinguishable if the following holds
for every (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm D and all ω ∈ N:
∣∣∣Pr[t← Xω : D(t) = 1]− Pr[t← Yω : D(t) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(ω),
where ǫ is a negligible function.
Definition 7 (Access Structure). Let P = {P1, . . . , Pℓ} be a set of parties. A collection Γ ⊆ 2
P is
monotone if A ∈ Γ and A ⊆ B imply that B ∈ Γ . An access structure Γ ⊆ 2P is a monotone collection of
non-empty subsets of P. Sets in Γ are called authorized, and sets not in Γ are called unauthorized.
If Γ consists of all subsets of P with size greater than or equal to a fixed threshold t (1 ≤ t ≤ ℓ), then Γ
is called a t-threshold access structure.
Definition 8 (Minimal Authorized Subset). For an access structure Γ , a family of minimal authorized
subsets Γ0 ∈ Γ is defined as:
Γ0 = {A ∈ Γ : B 6⊂ A for all B ∈ Γ \ {A}}.
Definition 9 (Computational Secret Sharing [33]). A computational secret sharing scheme with re-
spect to an access structure Γ , security parameter ω, a set of ℓ polynomial-time parties P = {P1, . . . , Pℓ},
and a set of secrets K, consists of a pair of polynomial-time algorithms, (Share,Recon), where:
– Share is a randomized algorithm that gets a secret k ∈ K and access structure Γ as inputs, and outputs
ℓ shares, {Π
(k)
1 , . . . ,Π
(k)
ℓ }, of k,
– Recon is a deterministic algorithm that gets as input the shares of a subset A ⊆ P, denoted by {Π
(k)
i }i∈A,
and outputs a string in K,
such that, the following two requirements are satisfied:
1. Perfect Correctness: for all secrets k ∈ K and every authorized subset A ∈ Γ , it holds that:
Pr[Recon({Π
(k)
i }i∈A,A) = k] = 1,
2. Computational Secrecy: for every unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ and all different secrets k1, k2 ∈ K, it holds
that the distributions {Π
(k1)
i }i∈B and {Π
(k2)
i }i∈B are computationally indistinguishable (with respect to
ω).
Remark 2 (Perfect Secrecy). If ∀k1, k2 ∈ K with k1 6= k2, the distributions {Π
(k1)
i }i∈B and {Π
(k2)
i }i∈B are
identical, then the scheme is called a perfect secret sharing scheme.
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2.1 Set Systems with Restricted Intersections
The problem of constructing set systems under certain intersection restrictions and bounding their size has
a central place in Extremal Set Theory. We shall not give a full account of such problems, but only touch
upon the results that are particularly relevant to our set-system and its construction. For a broader account,
we refer the interested reader to the survey by Frankl and Tokushige [22].
Lemma 1 ([26]). Let m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i be a positive integer with r > 1 different prime divisors. Then there
exists an explicitly constructible polynomial Q with n variables and degree O(n1/r), which is equal to 0 on
z = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {0, 1}n but is nonzero mod m on all other z ∈ {0, 1}n. Furthermore, ∀z ∈ {0, 1}n and
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, it holds that: Q(z) ∈ {0, 1} mod pαii .
Theorem 2 ([26]). Let m be a positive integer, and suppose that m has r > 1 different prime divisors:
m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i . Then there exists c = c(m) > 0, such that for every integer h > 0, there exists an explicitly
constructible uniform set-system H over a universe of h elements such that:
1. |H| ≥ exp
(
c
(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
,
2. ∀H ∈ H : |H| = 0 mod m,
3. ∀G,H ∈ H, G 6= H : |G ∩H| 6= 0 mod m.
Matching Vectors. A matching vector family is a combinatorial object that is defined as:
Definition 10 ([18]). Let S ⊆ Zm\{0}, and 〈·, ·〉 denote the inner product. We say that subsets U = {ui}
N
i=1
and V = {vi}
N
i=1 of vectors in (Zm)
h form an S-matching family if the following two conditions are satisfied:
– ∀i ∈ [N ], it holds that: 〈ui,vi〉 = 0 mod m,
– ∀i, j ∈ [N ] such that i 6= j, it holds that: 〈ui,vj〉 mod m ∈ S.
The question of bounding the size of matching vector families is closely related to the well-known Extremal
Set Theory problem of constructing set systems with restricted modular intersections. Matching vectors have
found applications in the context of private information retrieval [4, 2, 19, 18, 20, 53, 35], conditional disclosure
of secrets [35], secret sharing [36] and coding theory [18]. The first super-polynomial size matching vector
family follows directly from the set-system constructed by Grolmusz [26]. If each set H in the set-system
H defined by Theorem 2 is represented by a vector u ∈ (Zm)
h, then it leads to the following family of
S-matching vectors:
Corollary 1 ([18] to Theorem 2). Let h,m > 0, and suppose that m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i has r > 1 different prime
divisors. Then, there exists a set S of size 2r−1 and a family of S-matching vectors {u}Ni=1, ui ∈ (Zm)
h, such
that, N ≥ exp
(
c
(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
.
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3 Access Structure Hiding Computational Secret Sharing: Definition
In this section, we give a formal definition of an access structure hiding computational secret sharing scheme.
Definition 11. An access structure hiding computational secret sharing scheme with respect to an access
structure Γ , a set of ℓ polynomial-time parties P = {P1, . . . , Pℓ}, a set of secrets K and a security parameter ω,
consists of two pairs of polynomial-time algorithms, (HsGen, HsVer) and (Share, Recon), where (Share,
Recon) are the same as defined in the definition of computational secret sharing (see Definition 9), and
(HsGen, HsVer) are defined as:
– HsGen is a randomized algorithm that gets P and Γ as inputs, and outputs ℓ access structure tokens
{℧
(Γ )
1 , . . . ,℧
(Γ )
ℓ },
– HsVer is a deterministic algorithm that gets as input the access structure tokens of a subset A ⊆ P,
denoted by {℧
(Γ )
i }i∈A, and outputs b ∈ {0, 1},
such that, the following three requirements are satisfied:
1. Perfect Completeness: every authorized subset of parties A ∈ Γ can identify itself to be a member of the
access structure Γ , i.e., formally, it holds that: Pr[HsVer({℧
(Γ )
i }i∈A) = 1] = 1,
2. Perfect Soundness: every unauthorized subset of parties B /∈ Γ can identify itself to be outside of the
access structure Γ , i.e., formally, it holds that: Pr[HsVer({℧
(Γ )
i }i∈B) = 0] = 1,
3. Computational Hiding: for all access structures Γ, Γ ′ ⊆ 2P , where Γ 6= Γ ′, and each subset of parties
B /∈ Γ, Γ ′ that is unauthorized in both Γ and Γ ′, it holds that:
∣∣∣Pr[Γ | {℧(Γ )i }i∈B, {Π(k)i }i∈B]− Pr[Γ ′ | {℧(Γ )i }i∈B, {Π(k)i }i∈B]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(ω),
where ǫ is a negligible function and {Π
(k)
i }i∈B denotes the subset of shares of a secret k, that belong to
the parties in B, and are generated by Share with respect to the access structure Γ .
4 Novel Set-Systems and Vector Families
In this section, we construct our novel set-systems and vector families. The following notations are frequently
used throughout this section.
– We denote the coefficient of xk in the power series for f(x) by [xk] : f(x),
– Let L be an ordered list of a finite number of different symbols, and u ∈ Le be a string comprised of
e ∈ N different symbols from L. We define ⊲ to represent string membership, i.e., j ⊲ u denotes that the
string u contains the jth symbol from the ordered list L.
8 V. S. Sehrawat and Y. Desmedt
4.1 Set System Construction
In this section, we provide the proof for Theorem 1 by giving an explicit construction of the set-system H
defined in it. Our construction is inspired by that of Grolmusz [26].
Proof (Theorem 1). We use the polynomial Q defined in Lemma 1 to construct our set-system. We begin by
recalling the following property of Q:
Q(z) = 0 mod m⇐⇒ z1 = z2 = · · · = zn = 1, (4.1)
where z = (z1, z2, . . . zn) ∈ {0, 1}
n. We know from Lemma 1 that Q has degree d = O(n1/r), and can be
written as:
Q(z1, z2, . . . , zn) =
∑
i1,i2,...,il
ai1,i2,...,ilzi1zi2 . . . zil ,
where 0 ≤ l ≤ d, and ai1,i2,...,il ∈ Z with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < il ≤ n. Reducing that modulo m, we get:
Q˜(z1, z2, . . . , zn) =
∑
i1,i2,...,il
a˜i1,i2,...,ilzi1zi2 . . . zil , (4.2)
where a˜i1,i2,...,il = ai1,i2,...,il mod m. Let L = (0, 1, . . . , n − 1) be an ordered list of n symbols. Define a
characteristic function ψ : {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}n → {0, 1}n as:
ψ(u)[j] :=

1 if j ⊲ u0 otherwise, (4.3)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n and ψ(u)[j] denotes the jth bit of ψ(u) ∈ {0, 1}n. If a string u ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}n, defined
over the symbols in L, contains the jth symbol from the ordered list L, then ψ(u)[j] = 1, else ψ(u)[j] = 0.
Define a comparison function δ(x, y) : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1} as:
δ(u, v) := ¬(u⊕ v), (4.4)
where ¬ and ⊕ denote negation and XOR, respectively. Hence, δ(u, v) = 1 if u = v, else δ(u, v) = 0. Let
A = (ax,y) be a n
n × nn matrix (x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}n). For x′ = ψ(x) and y′ = ψ(y), define each entry
ax,y as:
ax,y = Q˜(δ(x
′
1, y
′
1), δ(x
′
2, y
′
2), . . . , δ(x
′
n, y
′
n)) mod m, (4.5)
where Q˜(·) is the polynomial defined in Equation 4.2, and x′j , y
′
j denote the j
th bit of the binary bit strings
x′, y′ ∈ {0, 1}n. It follows from Equation 4.3, Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 that if ax,y = Q˜(1, 1, . . . , 1) =
0 mod m, then either x = y or ∀j ∈ [n] it holds that y′j = x
′
j, i.e., x and y are comprised of the same symbols.
In both cases, we say that x and y “cover” each other, and denote it by xΥy. We know from Equation 4.2
that the polynomial Q˜(z) can be defined as a sum of monomials zi1zi2 . . . zil (l ≤ d), where each monomial
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zi1zi2 . . . zil occurs with multiplicity a˜i1,i2,...,il in the sum. Therefore, since matrix A is generated via Q˜, it
follows from Equation 4.2 that A can be defined as the sum of matrices Bi1,i2,...,il , whose entries are defined
as:
bi1,i2,...,ilx,y = δ(x
′
i1 , y
′
i1)δ(x
′
i2 , y
′
i2) . . . δ(x
′
il
, y′il). (4.6)
Hence, it follows from Equation 4.2, Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.6, that A can be written as:
A =
∑
i1,i2,...,il
a˜i1,i2,...,ilBi1,i2,...,il , (4.7)
where a˜i1,i2,...,il is the multiplicity with which the matrix Bi1,i2,...,il occurs in the sum. Next, we analyze the
matrices A and Bi1,i2,...,il . In particular, we count the number of 0 entries in A and the number of 1 entries
in Bi1,i2,...,il .
Analysis of the Matrices. We begin by counting the total number of entries ax,y ∈ A that are equal to 0,
which translates into counting the number of x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}n such that xΥy.
Let S be a set of n different symbols. Let unique symbol weight (USW) denote the number of different
symbols in a string, i.e., USW(x) =w(ψ(x)), where w(·) denotes the Hamming weight. To form a string x of
length n such that USW(x) = k, for a fixed k ≤ n, the first step is to select k distinct symbols si1, si2 . . . , sik
from S. We know from Rosen [44] (Section 2.4.2), that the number of onto functions from a set of n elements
to a set of k elements is given by k!
{n
k
}
, where
{n
k
}
denotes Stirling number of the second kind (see Graham
et al. [25], p. 257). Hence, k!
{n
k
}
is the total number of strings of length n, that contain exactly the selected
k-out-of-n symbols: si1, si2 . . . , sik .
Let Nk denote the total number of different x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}
n such that USW(x) = k. We know that
for a fixed set of k-out-of-n symbols, the number strings x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}n satisfying USW(x) = k is
k!
{n
k
}
. Accounting for the number of ways one can choose k-out-of-n symbols, we get:
Nk =
(
n
k
)
k!
{
n
k
}
.
We know that for each k, there are Nk rows in matrix A that “cover” exactly k!
{n
k
}
entries. Hence, from
Equation 4.5, the number of ax,y = 0 mod m entries in A is:
S(n) =
n∑
k=1
Nk · k!
{
n
k
}
=
n∑
k=1
(
n
k
)
k!
{
n
k
}
k!
{
n
k
}
. (4.8)
We recall the following well known identities involving the first-order Eulerian numbers (see Graham et
al. [25], p. 267) and Stirling numbers of the second kind:
ℓ!
{
n
ℓ
}
=
n∑
k=0
〈
n
k
〉(
k
n− ℓ
)
; (n− ℓ)!
{
n
n− ℓ
}
=
n∑
k=0
〈
n
k
〉(
k
ℓ
)
,
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where
〈n
k
〉
denotes the first-order Eulerian number, which gives the total number of permutations π1, π2, . . . , πn
with k ascents, i.e., k places where πt < πt+1. Therefore, Equation 4.8 can be rewritten as:
S(n) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
k!
{
n
k
}
k!
{
n
k
}
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
k!
{
n
k
}
n∑
j=0
〈
n
j
〉(
j
n− k
)
= n!
n∑
k=0
{
n
k
} n∑
j=0
〈
n
j
〉(
j
n− k
) 1
(n− k)!
.
Thus, the exponential generating function for S(n) comes out to be:
∑
n≥0
S(n)
xn
n!
=
∑
n≥0
n∑
k=0
{
n
k
}
xk

 n∑
j=0
〈
n
j
〉(
j
n− k
) xn−k
(n− k)!
.
Recall the following definition of Touchard polynomial (Jacques Touchard [52]):
Tn(x) =
n∑
k=0
{
n
k
}
xk.
We write S(n) as:
S(n) = n![xn] : (Tn(x)Pn(x)), (4.9)
where the second polynomial, Pn(x), is defined via convolution as:
Pn(x) =
n∑
k=0

 n∑
j=0
〈
n
j
〉(
j
k
)
 xk
k!
=
n∑
k=0
(n− k)!
k!
{
n
n− k
}
xk.
Observe that all diagonal entries ax,x in matrix A are 0, and A is symmetric across its diagonal.
Lemma 2. Let the term B-entries denote the entries bi1,i2,...,ilx,y ∈ Bi1,i2,...,il that are equal to 1. Then the
following holds for B-entries:
1. ∀x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}n, each entry ax,x ∈ A has the same number of B-entries, b
i1,i2,...,il
x,x = 1, and this
number is divisible by m,
2. for each pair x, y (x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}n), the total number of B-entries, bi1,i2,...,ilx,y = 1, corresponding
to ax,y ∈ A, is divisible by m iff xΥy, else not.
Proof. We know from Equation 4.6 that except for the B-entries, all other entries in matrices Bi1,i2,...,il
are equal to 0. Hence, it follows from Equation 4.7 that each entry ax,y ∈ A is simply the total number
of B-entries, bi1,i2,...,ilx,y = 1. It further follows from Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.1 that for all x, we get
ax,x = Q˜(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 0 mod m, i.e., for all x, the total number of B-entries, b
i1,i2,...,il
x,x = 1, is divisible
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by m. Furthermore, it follows from Equation 4.6 that because x = x, all entries bi1,i2,...,ilx,x are indeed B-
entries and all cells ax,x have the same number of corresponding B-entries, b
i1,i2,...,il
x,x = 1. Finally, it follows
from Equation 4.5 and Equation 4.1 that for all pairs (x, y), where x 6= y, the total number of B-entries,
bi1,i2,...,ilx,y = 1, is: ax,y = Q˜(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 0 mod m if xΥy, and ax,y 6= 0 mod m otherwise. 
By taking all ax,y = 0 mod m (∀x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}
n) entries ofA to denote sets with the corresponding
B-entries, bi1,i2,...,ilx,y = 1, as the elements in those sets leads to a set-system H, that satisfies Conditions 2
and 3 of Theorem 1. The number of elements, h, over which H is defined is:
h = Q˜(n, n, . . . , n) =
∑
l≤d
∑
a˜i1,i2,...,iln
l ≤ (m− 1)
∑
l≤d
(
n
l
)
nl
< (m− 1)
∑
l≤d
n2l/l! < 2(m− 1)n2d/d!,
assuming n ≥ 2d. Since d > 2, we get: n > 4. From Equation 4.9, it is easy to verify that the following holds
for n > 2:
|H| = S(n) > n1.5n. (4.10)
We know from [26] that for r > 1,m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i , d = O(n
1/r), c = c(m) > 0 and h < 2(m − 1)n2d/d!, the
following relation holds:
nn ≥ exp
(
c
(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
.
Therefore, the following can be derived from Equation 4.10 and elementary estimations for binomial coeffi-
cients:
|H| > exp
(
c
1.5(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
.
A tighter bound can be derived by using Lambert W function and the results from Corless et al. [13] on the
principal branch of Lambert W function, but the bound derived above suffices for our purpose. Since m ≥ 6
and r ≥ 2, the size of our set-system H is strictly greater than exp
(
c
1.5(log h)2
log log h
)
. Condition 4 of Theorem 1
follows directly from Lemma 1. It is easy to verify that the total number of B-entries corresponding to each
cell (x, y), where x 6= y and for which ax,y = 0 mod m, is not same. Moreover, since all b
i1,i2,...,il
x,x entries are
indeed B-entries, it holds that ax,y < ax,x for all x 6= y. Hence, the sets in H do not have the same size,
making H a non-uniform set-system. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
4.2 Covering Vector Families
Definition 12 (Covering Vectors). Let m,h > 0 be positive integers, S ⊆ Zm \ {0}, and w(·) and 〈·, ·〉
denote Hamming weight and inner product, respectively. We say that a subset V = {vi}
N
i=1 of vectors in
(Zm)
h forms an S-covering family of vectors if the following two conditions are satisfied:
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– ∀i ∈ [N ], it holds that: 〈vi,vi〉 = 0 mod m,
– ∀i, j ∈ [N ], where i 6= j, it holds that:
〈vi,vj〉 mod m =

0 if w(vi ◦ vj mod m) = 0 mod m∈ S otherwise,
where ◦ denotes Hadamard/Schur product (see Definition 4).
Recall from Theorem 1 that h,m are positive integers, with m =
∏r
i=1 p
αi
i having r > 1 different prime
divisors. Further, recall Condition 4 of Theorem 1, which implies that the sizes of the pairwise intersections
of the sets in H occupy at most 2r − 1 residue classes modulo m. If each set Hi ∈ H is represented by a
representative vector vi ∈ (Zm)
h, then for the resulting subset V of vectors in (Zm)
h, the following result
follows from Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 (to Theorem 1). For the set-system H defined in Theorem 1, if each set Hi ∈ H is represented
by a unique vector vi ∈ (Zm)
h, then for a set S of size 2r − 1, the set of vectors V = {vi}
N
i=1, formed by the
representative vectors of all sets in H, forms an S-covering family such that N > exp
(
c
1.5(log h)r
(log log h)r−1
)
and
∀i, j ∈ [N ] it holds that 〈vi,vj〉= |Hi ∩Hj|(mod m).
5 Our Scheme
In Section 5.1, we introduce an algorithm to encode and identify hidden access structures, that remain
unknown unless some authorized subset of parties collaborate. Followed by that, in Section 5.2, we extend
that algorithm into an access structure hiding computational secret sharing scheme. We assume semi-honest
polynomial-time parties, which try to gain additional information while correctly following the protocols.
The following notations are frequently used from hereon.
– If each party Pi holds a value xi, then for any subset of parties A, {xi}i∈A denotes the set of all xi values
that belong to the parties Pi ∈ A,
–
∏
i∈A xi and
∑
i∈A xi respectively denote the product and sum of all values from the set {xi}i∈A,
– large prime: refers to a prime number of size equal to or greater than the minimum size recommended
by NIST for primes [1].
5.1 Access Structure Encoding Scheme (ASES)
In this section, we describe our scheme to encode and identify hidden access structures. Let P = {P1, . . . , Pℓ}
be a set of ℓ polynomial-time parties and Ω ∈ Γ0 be any minimal authorized subset (see Definition 8). Hence,
each party Pi ∈ P can be identified as Pi ∈ Ω or Pi ∈ P \ Ω.
Setup. The scheme is initialized as follows:
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1. For η ≫ ℓ, generate a set of distinct large primes, {p1, p2, . . . , pη}. Generate a prime q = u
∏η
i=1 pi + 1,
where u is an integer. We know from Dirichlet’s Theorem (see Definition 2) that there are infinitely many
such primes q. Generating q in this manner ensures hardness of the discrete log problem in Zq [29] which,
by extension, translates into hardness of the Generalized Diffie-Hellman assumption in Zq.
2. Let w =
∏η
i=1 pi and m = ϕ(q). Then, it follows from q = u
∏η
i=1 pi + 1 that w|ϕ(q), where ϕ denotes
Euler’s totient function (see Definition 3). Hence, following holds for primes βd and positive integers αd:
m = w ·
∏
d≥1
βαdd =
η∏
i=1
pi ·
∏
d≥1
βαdd .
Let r = d+ η denote the total number of prime factors of m.
3. Construct a set-system H modulo m (as defined by Theorem 1). Let V ∈ (Zm)
h denote the covering
vectors family (as defined by Corollary 2) representing H such that each vector vi ∈ V represents a
unique set Hi ∈ H.
4. Randomly sample H ∈ H. Let v ∈ V be the representative vector for H. We call v and H the access
structure vector and access structure set, respectively.
Distributing Access Structures. Following procedure “encodes” the access structure Γ that originates
from Ω, and outputs ℓ access structure tokens.
1. For each party Pi ∈ Ω, randomly select a unique vector vi
$
←− V, such that, 〈v,vi〉 6= 0 mod m (i.e., H 6⊆
Hi and Hi 6⊆ H) and v =
∑
i∈Ω vi mod m. Compute the identifier for party Pi as: xi = 〈v,vi〉 mod m.
2. For each party Pe ∈ P \ Ω, select a unique covering party Pi ∈ Ω. Let Hi ∈ H be the set represented by
Pi’s covering vector, vi ∈ V. Randomly sample Hj ∈ H, such that, Hi ⊂ Hj. Let vj ∈ V be the covering
vector representing Hj.
3. Compute ve ∈ V such that: ve + vi = vj mod m. Verify that 〈v,ve〉 6= 0 mod m, which translates into
H 6⊆ He,He 6⊆ H, for He ∈ H represented by ve. If these requirements do not hold, go back to Step 2.
4. Compute the identifier for party Pe as: xe = 〈v,ve〉 mod m. Generating identifiers in this manner for
parties Pe ∈ P \ Ω ensures that they are “covered” by the identifiers of parties in Ω. Since each party
Pi ∈ Ω can “cover” at most one party Pe ∈ P \ Ω, our scheme requires that |P| ≤ 2 · |Ω|.
5. Each party Pz ∈ P receives an access structure token t
(Γ )
z = µxz mod q, where µ
$
←− Z∗q \ {1}.
In case of an identifier collision, i.e., xi = xj, where xj is the identifier of another party Pj ∈ P, re-generate
the identifier for either Pi or Pj . Recall from Corollary 2 that 〈v,vi〉 occupies ≤ 2
r−1 residue classes mod m.
Therefore, the probability of an identifier collision is ≈ 1/(2r − 1)2, which may be non-negligible. The set
of parameters {m, q,H,V, µ} defines an ASES instance. Since our scheme works with a minimal authorized
subset, the set of identifiers, {xz}z∈P , represents 2
ℓ out of the 22
ℓ−O(log ℓ)
possible access structures.
Access Structure Identification. Theorem 3 proves that any authorized subset of parties A ∈ Γ can use
its set of access structure tokens, {t
(Γ )
i }i∈A, to identify itself as a member of the access structure Γ .
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Theorem 3. Every authorized subset A ∈ Γ can identify itself as a member of the access structure Γ by
verifying that:
∏
i∈A t
(Γ )
i = 1 mod q.
Proof. Recall that for any authorized subset A ∈ Γ , it holds that the set HA ∈ H, represented by
∑
i∈A vi =
vA, is a superset of the access structure set H ∈ H, i.e., H ⊆ HA. Hence, from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2,
it follows that: 〈v,vA〉 = 0 mod m = y · m = y · ϕ(q), where y is a positive integer. This translates into
µ〈v,vA〉 = 1 mod q (using Euler’s theorem). Hence, the following holds for all authorized subsets A ∈ Γ :
∏
i∈A
t
(Γ )
i =
∏
i∈A
µxi = µ
〈
v,
∑
i∈A
vi
〉
= µ〈v,vA〉 = µy·ϕ(q) = 1 mod q. 
Perfect Soundness and Computational Hiding.
Theorem 4. Every unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ can identify itself to be outside Γ by using its set of access
structure tokens, {t
(Γ )
i }i∈B, to verify that:
∏
i∈B t
(Γ )
i 6= 1 mod q. Given that the Generalized Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard, the following holds for all unauthorized subsets B /∈ Γ and all access structures Γ ′ ⊆ 2P ,
where Γ 6= Γ ′ and B /∈ Γ ′:
∣∣∣Pr[Γ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B]− Pr[Γ ′ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(ω),
where ω = |P \ B| is the security parameter and ǫ is a negligible function.
Proof. It follows from the ASES procedure that for all unauthorized subsets B /∈ Γ , it holds that the set
HB ∈ H, represented by
∑
i∈B vi = vB, cannot be a superset or subset of the access structure set H ∈ H.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 that: 〈v,vB〉 6= 0 mod m, which translates into the following
relation by Euler’s theorem (since m = ϕ(q) and µ
$
←− Z∗q \ {1}) :
∏
i∈B
t
(Γ )
i =
∏
i∈B
µxi = µ
〈
v,
∑
i∈B
vi
〉
= µ〈v,vB〉 6= 1 mod q.
Hence, any unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ can identify itself as not being a part of the access structure Γ by
simply multiplying its access structure tokens, {t
(Γ )
i }i∈B. The security parameter ω = |P \ B| accounts for
this minimum information that is available to any unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ .
If some unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing access structure Γ
from any other Γ ′ ⊆ 2P , where Γ 6= Γ ′ and B /∈ Γ ′, then the following must hold for some non-negligible
function χ: ∣∣∣Pr[Γ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B]− Pr[Γ ′ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B]∣∣∣ ≥ χ(ω), (5.1)
Let g ∈ Z∗q be a generator of Z
∗
q (recall that Z
∗
q is a cyclic group). We know that the setup procedure
used to generate q ensures that: |Z∗q | = ϕ(q)≫ |P|. Hence, given that g is a generator of Z
∗
q, it follows that
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for each identifier xi, there exists some ai ∈ Z such that: µ
xi = gai mod q. Therefore, by extension, it follows
that for all sets B, there exists set(s) of n different integers IB = {a1, . . . , an}, where n = |B|, such that
µ
∑
i∈B
xi = g
∏n
i=1
ai mod q. Hence, it holds that:
∏
i∈B µ
xi = g
∏n
i=1
ai mod q.
We know that each unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ has at least one proper superset A ) B, such that A ∈ Γ .
Since g is a generator of Z∗q, there exists set(s) of n
′ different integers IA = IB ∪ {an+1, . . . , an′}, where
n′ = |A|, such that the following holds:
∏
i∈A µ
xi = g
∏n′
i=1
ai mod q.
We know that in order to satisfy Equation 5.1, B must gain some non-negligible information about g
∏n′
i=1
ai
in Z∗q. We also know that B can compute g
∏n
i=1
ai mod q. Hence, it follows directly from Definition 1 that
gaining any non-negligible information about g
∏n′
i=1
ai from g
∏n
i=1
ai in Z∗q requires solving the Generalized
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem. Therefore, Equation 5.1 cannot hold given that the GDH assumption holds.
Hence, the advantage of B /∈ Γ must be negligible in the security parameter ω. 
5.2 Building the Full Scheme
The following procedure allows an honest dealer to employ the ASES scheme and realize an access structure
hiding computational secret sharing scheme.
1. Perform ASES to generate access structure tokens t
(Γ )
z = µxz mod q, for each party Pz ∈ P.
2. Follow Step 1 of the setup procedure of ASES to generate a suitable prime q′.
3. Generate a set-system H′ modulo m′ (as defined by Theorem 1), where m′ = ϕ(q′). Let V ′ denote the
covering vector family (as defined by Corollary 2) that is formed by the representative vectors vi ∈ V for
the sets Hi ∈ H.
4. Generate the secret that needs to be shared: k
$
←− Z∗q′ , and randomly sample |Ω| integers, {bi}
|Ω|
i=1, such
that:
∏|Ω|
i=1 bi = k mod q
′.
5. Generate γ
$
←− Z∗q′ \ {1}. For each party Pj ∈ P \Ω, employ ASES with parameters {m
′, q′,H′,V ′, γ} to
generate identifier yj ∈ Zm, and access structure token: s
(k)
j = γ
yj mod q′. Party Pj receives s
(k)
j as its
share.
6. The share for each party Pi ∈ Ω is generated as: s
(k)
i = (bi · γ
yi) mod q′. Each party Pz ∈ P receives
<access structure token, share> pair: (t
(Γ )
z , s
(k)
z ).
Completeness, Soundness, Correctness, Secrecy and Hiding: We prove that our access structure
hiding computational secret sharing scheme satisfies the completeness, soundness, correctness, hiding and
secrecy requirements outlined by the definition of Access Structure Hiding Computational Secret Sharing
(see Definition 11). Since independent iterations of ASES are used to generate the access structure tokens and
shares, perfect completeness follows directly from Theorem 3. Similarly, perfect soundness and computational
hiding follow directly from Theorem 4. Hence, we move on to proving perfect correctness and computational
secrecy.
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Perfect Correctness: It follows directly from Theorem 3 that for all authorized subsets A ∈ Γ , it holds that:∏
i∈A γ
yi = 1 mod q′. Hence, any A ∈ Γ can reconstruct the secret, k, by combining its shares as:
∏
i∈A
s
(k)
i mod q
′ = 1 ·
∏
y∈Ω
by mod q
′ = k, (using
∏
i∈A
γyi = 1 mod q′).
Since each party Pz ∈ P receives two elements, s
(k)
i and t
(Γ )
i , both of which have (almost) the same size as
the secret, the information rate of our scheme is ≈ 1/2.
Computational Secrecy: Since independent iterations of ASES are used to generate the sets {t
(Γ )
z }z∈P and
{s
(k)
z }z∈P , computational indistinguishability (w.r.t. security parameter ω = |P \ B|) of all different access
structures Γ, Γ ′ ⊆ 2P , for all unauthorized subsets B /∈ Γ, Γ ′ follows directly from Theorem 4, i.e., it holds
that: ∣∣∣Pr[Γ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B, {s(k)i }i∈B]− Pr[Γ ′ | {t(Γ )i }i∈B, {s(k)i }i∈B]∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ(ω).
Theorem 5. Given that GDH problem is hard, it holds for every unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ and all different
secrets k1, k2 ∈ K that the distributions {s
(k1)
i }i∈B and {s
(k2)
i }i∈B are computationally indistinguishable w.r.t.
the security parameter ω = |P \ B|.
Proof. Since the set {bi}
|Ω|
i=1 is generated randomly, secrecy of the bi values follows from one-time pad. Moving
on to the secrecy of γyi values: since γ(6= 1) is a random element from Z∗q′ , there exists a generator g of Z
∗
q′
(note that Z∗q′ is a cyclic group) such that for each identifier, yi, generated by the ASES procedure, there
exists an ai ∈ Z such that: γ
yi = gai mod q′. By extension, there exists set(s) of n different integers IB =
{a1, . . . , an}, where n = |B|, such that:
∏
i∈B γ
yi = g
∏n
i=1
ai mod q′. We know that each unauthorized subset
B /∈ Γ has at least one proper superset A ) B, such that A ∈ Γ . Since g is a generator of Z∗q′ , there exists
set(s) of n′ different integers IA = IB∪{an+1, . . . , an′}, where n
′ = |A|, such that:
∏
i∈A γ
yi = g
∏n′
i=1
ai mod q′.
It follows from Definition 1 that in order to gain any non-negligible information about g
∏n′
i=1
ai from g
∏n
i=1
ai ,
in Z∗q′ , B must solve the GDH problem. Therefore, for every unauthorized subset B /∈ Γ , computational
indistinguishability of {s
(k1)
i }i∈B and {s
(k2)
i }i∈B w.r.t. the security parameter ω follows directly from the
GDH assumption. 
Open Problems
Our access structure hiding secret sharing scheme requires that |P| ≤ 2|Ω|, where Ω ∈ Γ0 is any mini-
mal authorized subset. It is worth exploring whether this restriction can be further relaxed, or removed.
Another interesting problem is defining and constructing set-systems and vector families that can support
simultaneous encoding of multiple minimal authorized subsets.
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